When comparing professional armies, such as Israel’s, with semi‑military groups like Iran’s Revolutionary Guard or Lebanon’s Hezbollah, many assume that militias have unique advantages—guerrilla capability and flexible command—while regular forces are rigid. In reality, the strengths attributed to militias—decentralized execution, guerrilla tactics—are also present in modern professional armies. For example, the U.S. Army’s doctrine emphasizes “centralized control, decentralized execution,” and special‑operations units in the U.S. and Israel can conduct guerrilla‑style missions far more effectively than any militia.
The perceived drawbacks of conventional armies are not inherent flaws but often stem from specific political or institutional contexts, such as the historically under‑performing Arab militaries of the 1950s‑60s. Conversely, the benefits of a national professional army—nationwide recruitment, strict hierarchy, robust intelligence protection—cannot be transferred to militia structures, which typically lack these systemic safeguards.
Thus, when a militia like Hezbollah displays professionalism, it reflects capabilities that exist across many modern armies, not an exclusive advantage. While militias have achieved notable successes, these arise mainly because they fill security gaps left by absent state forces, not because they would necessarily fail if integrated into a regular army.